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Article 13

In Vitro Fertilization and Ethical Dualism
Brian V. Johnstone, C.SS.R.

Father Johnstone, an associate professor of moral theology at the
Catho lic Un iversity of A merica, studied theology at St. Mary's Seminary,
Ballarat, Australia, at the Anselmianum in Rome, at the Universities of
Bonn and Tuebigen, and at the Catholic University of Louvainfrom which
he received his doctorate in 1973.

The procedure of in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer has become
an established and widely accepted method of overcoming so me forms of
infertility. This article will be concerned with some of the ethical issues
which have been raised. These relate to two areas above all: those touching
on the value of life and those related to the values of human sexuality,
marriage and parenthood. Under the first heading would come the very
serious problems raised by the loss of human embryos, the discarding or
deliberate destruction of embryos, experimentation upon them and
abortion of defectives. These questions have been raIsed in particular form
by recent government appointed committees in some countries. I Since this
range of issues would require an extensive analysis in their own right, I will
not attempt to deal with them here. 2 Attention will be focused on the
seCORd set of values. The precise question to be addressed will be: how are
IYF and ET to be assessed ethically from the perspectiv of the Christian
and, in particular, the Roman Catholic tradition on the meaning of human
sexuality, marriage and parenthood? I propose to review a number of
significant contributions to the debate which have emerged from within
the tradition. Such a review will indicate how these issues have been
treated, the presuppositions and the significant developments in ethical
thinking which the debate has occasioned .
The inseparability of the unitive and procreative dimensions or
meanings of human sexuality has been a central feature of Roman
Catholic moral doctrine. 3 Artificial contraception is rejected because it
separates the love-union and procreation. IYF also entails the separation
of love-union (sexual intercourse) and procreation (in the petri dish).
Must, then , I Y F be rejected on the same grounds?
Before dealing with the question of IYF it will be necessary to analyze
some of the more general issues which recent discussion has brought to
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light. I believe one of the most important is the alleged presence of a form
of "dualism" in some of the arguments which have been presented . As a
first step, therefore, I will attempt to sketch out the main outlines of this
problem.
Integral Humanity vs. Dualism
Throughout its history, the tradition which concerns us here has often
had to struggle with various forms of "dualism." It has been constrained to
resist tendencies to split apart soul-body and to uphold the integrity of the
human. Some philosophies and theologies have exalted the spirit or mind
and devalued the body. Others have elevated the physical at the expense of
the spirit. This problem appears in contemporary discussions of the
Roman Catholic tradition, but is presented in two quite different ways .
There is, on the one hand , a critique of certain traditional positions on the
grounds that these are based on a form of dualism which separates
rationality and animality in the human. 4 The burden of the charge is that
these positions accord a morally definitive meaning to the physical
structures of humanity, prior to and apart from the rational or spiritual.
For the sake of brevity, this position will be referred to as "physicalist
dualism."
Argument Challenges Dualism
A second argument challenges a kind of dualism which equates the truly
human with rational consciousness , or with what can be consciously
experienced. This kind of dualism, it is argued , reduces the bodily to the
merely biological, that is , to the subpersonal, subhuman level. The bodily,
and , specifically, the procreative aspect of human sexuality, is thus
reduced to the level of the merely instrumentaJ.5 In such a view, the bodily
aspect has no inherent moral significance, apart from its capacity to be
used instrumentally for the purposes of the rational agent. Perhaps we
could name this "instrumental dualism." We could construct two different
forms of argument corresponding to the two distinct types of dualism. The
first argument would be based on the premise that the physical, biological
structure itself sets the moral norm. The second would take its foundation
on the presumption that the physical , biological structure in itself has no
moral significance. The first type of argument would reject IVF on the sole
ground of the physical separation of sexual union and procreation. The
second argument would justify IVF on the ground that the separation is , in
itself, morally neutral and is given its moral meaning by the end intended .
An argument of the first kind would be open to the objections directed
against "physicalist dualism."6 On the other hand, an argument of the
second kind would be exposed to objections that it rests on the
presupposition of "instrumental dualism." Neither form of argument
seems to take adequate account of integral humanity.
The next question to be asked is whether the relevant teaching of the
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Magisterium rests on the sole ground of the physical inseparability of
sexual union and procreation. In the analysis which follows, I will argue
that it does not. Together with this, it must also be asked whether those
who have argued for IYF under some conditions, do so on the grounds
that bodily and physical sexuality has no significance which is morally
relevant. In particular, do they hold that the separation of sexual union
from procreation is neutral from a moral perspective?7
Integral Humanity in the Teaching of the Magisterium

To resolve the fundamental problem, we need some way of
conceptualizing integral humanity in such a way as to display the complex
variety of relevant features and their connection with one another.
Further, we need to explain why it is that this integrated humanity has
morally normative status . I suggest that this notion of integral humanity
is not fully clear and that at least some of the difficulties of the present
debate may arise from this lack. In what follows, I will suggest some ways
towards a clarification of this point.
It has been common to express this complex of integrated elements in
terms of a "design." Thus, authors commonly spoke ofthe "natural design
of the act ," or the "divine design." However, there are further questions to
be asked as to (I) what are the relevant elements of this design? (2) what is
the unifying principle of the design? and (3) why is that the design has the
normative moral significance? In other terms, why is it wrong to disrupt it?
Pius XII indicated at least the principle elements of the design when he
stated that:
A child is the fruit of conjugal union when this union is fully expressed by
the bringing into play of the organic functions and the sensory emotions
attached to them, and of the spiritual and disinterested love which
animates this union. It is in the unity of this human act that the biological
conditions of generation must be posited. 8

The elements identified here are: (I) the physical sexual act (organic); (2)
the biological conditions of generation (union of sperm and ovum, etc.);
(3) the emotional elements of the union; (4) the spiritual elements (the love
which is expressed in the act which we could perhaps rephrase as
interpersonal love, reaching out towards a child to be loved) . This would
seem to be an adequate account of what is involved.
What is the unifying principle which links all these features together? In
this and other statements, Pius XII spoke of several such unifying features:
(I) the natural structure of the act; (2) the nature of the agents; (3) the
nature of intercourse as mutual gift in "one flesh", (4) the moral act which
draws all together. Finally, he mentioned several grounds for the
normative status of this integrated design: (I) the will and plan of the
Creator; (2) the dignity of the marriage partners; (3) their bodily and
spiritual nature, (4) the requirements of the develop ment of the child; (5)
68
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what is willed by nature; (6) the rights which husband and wife give each
other. 9 Clearly, Pius did not assert that the sole ground which established
the normativity of the integral process was the physical structure of the act.
In his encyclical "Humanae Vitae," Paul VI wrote of the integrally
human , and the integral human vocation. 10 He then went on to explain this
in terms of the nature of conjugal love. This has its origin in God. Couples
participate in this love by mutual self-giving which is proper and exclusive
and by which they pursue the personal communion by which they perfect
each other, and are associated with God in the task of procreating and
educating living beings. The necessary qualities of this love are then
explained as fully human, complete (a special form offriendship), faithful,
exclusive, and fruitful. 11 Further, when it is explained how this love is to be ·
expressed in the task of responsible parenthood , further features are
included. For example, in regard to the biological processes, conscious
parenthood entails the knowledge of and respect for their functi·ons, since
human reason discerns in the faculty of procreating life, laws which pertain
to the human person. 12 This, of course, brings us directly to the much
debated questions ofthe natural law and its significance for papal teaching
on sexuality and procreation.
Most recently, in an address on this subject, Pope John Paul II again
presented, as the central issue, integral humanity or, in his terms , "the unity
of (man's) personal being."13 The Pope stated that the central issue was
consistency with a Christian view of sexuality as an expression of conjugal
love. "For sexuality reflects the innermost being of the human person as
such, and is realized in a truly human way only if it is an integral part ofthe
love by which a man and a woman commit themselves totally to one
another until death."14
A Basis for Agreement Within the Tradition

In these accounts, it is clear that the physical integrity of he act of sexual
intercourse is not the sole ground of the moral norm . In order to make this
extensive range of other factors more manageable, we could perhaps
group them together as : (I) love values ; where the significant feature is the
integrity of marital, inter-personal, parental love; (2) dignity values; where
the concern would be the personal dignity of husband , wife and the child
and also that of other persons who may be involved (e.g. , donors); (3)
bodily values, where the issue would be the integrity of the bodily
processes and actions involved.
The love values relate to the intentions of those concerned and to
deliberately adopted attitudes towards others. One party might
deliberately withhold love from the other, or one or both adopt an attitude
of rejection of love to the child who might be conceived. In such a case, the
choice to pursue IVF would clearly be morally vitiated at root. The dignity
values relate to the intentions and attitudes of those concerned and to the
quality of their relationships to one another. It would be possible that
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the wife might be regarded as a mere "instrument" in the process (e.g. , as
mere provider of ova and womb). Or the husband might be regarded as
mere instrument (e .g., as provider of sperm). Or, finally, the child-to-be
might be regarded as mere instrument (e .g. , for the satisfaction of egotistic
desires on the part of the parents to achieve the satisfaction of having a
child.)1 5 In these cases, the persons would not be loved for their own sake,
but sought as mere means to some other end.
As far as I am aware , both those who would accept IYF under certain
conditions and those who would reject it absolutely would agree with
what has been proposed here. Such a clear violation of love-value and l or
dignity-values would constitute the choice morally wrong. It is at the point
where the body-values are introduced into consideration that clear
differences emerge.
Points of Disagreement
Three types of argument are presented. The first type would assert that
since, on the physical level , I YF entails the separation of sexual intercourse
and procreation, it is morally wrong precisely for this reason . Physical
separation tout court constitutes the choice of the procedure morally
wrong .
The second type of argument does not claim that IYF is morally wrong
merely because it entails the physical separation of sexual intercourse from
procreation. Rather, it is argued that where a couple choose a procedure
which deviates from the physically integral act, such a choice inevitably
has negative implications for the dignity of the persons involved, the
quality and dignity of their relationships to each other, and for the
authenticity of marititl-parentallove. On these multiple grounds , it is then
judged to be morally wrong.
The third type argues that physical separation of sexual intercourse and
procreation cannot , of itself, constitute grounds for mor'll condemnation.
Granted that the love values and dignity values are preserved in intention ,
these may be expressed and embodied in other choices of procedures
besides the integral physical, sexual act. That is, it is asserted that authentic
marital-parental love , expressed in such a way as to uphold the dignity of
the persons concerned , need not be expressed only in the integral, physical
sexual act. I now propose to examine each of these arguments in more
detail.
Type 1: Arguments from Physical Structure
In this argument the morally relevant features are to be found in the
physical structure of the act. Thus, the physical integrity of the act is given
morally normative status. Further, it has this morally normative status
because it is a (relatively) constant feature of human functioning and
therefore must be presumed to reflect the design of the One Who created
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the human organism. To violate the integrity of the structure of the act is ,
therefore, to violate the design of the creator. This "physicalist"
interpretation of the natural law has been the subject of frequent
criticism. 16
Some recent authors have explicitly challenged this form of the natural
law argument in its application to IYF and developed a case for the
acceptance of the procedure. For example, John Mahoney, S.J. criticizes
the questionable transition from fact to moral norm which the natural law
argument seems to entail. He then questions the assumption that since the
normal course of events is that natural intercourse is the means to
procreation , this normal structure must also be the morally normative
structure. Why, he asks , must natural intercourse be the only morally
acceptable means of procreation? He goes on to query the presumed
normative link between the normal structure of the loving procreative act
and the design of the Creator. If God has created humankind with
intelligence to control its environment and to discover means to ends , why
is it, then, that other means to the end of procreation which human
intelligence may discover are necessarily contrary to the design of the
Creator? He does not , in effect, question the requirement of marital,
interpersonal love between spouses , which reaches out towards a child to
be loved. Rather, He asks why such a love may be embodied only in the
normally structured act. Why may such love not be embodied in the
complex of actions , decisions, burdens and sufferings which the couple
undergo in seeking to conceive a child through IYF?1 7
Some of these objections are, of course, commonly raised in debates
about the "natural law." There are several points here which need
attention. The first is the question as to why marital-parental love may be
embodied only in the normally structured act. This is the right question
and other recent articles have sought to address it. But there is a second
point which is more problematical. This is the assumption that those who
argue that such love cannot be embodied in procedureS other than the
normally structured act, do so simply because they accept a physicalist
understanding of the natural law argument. Thus , the argument is
presumed to go as follows. Acts which deviate from the normally
structured act are contrary to the design of nature and therefore morally
wrong. Such morally wrong acts cannot embody and express rightly
ordered love. There would be a contradiction between the rightly ordered
love and the wrongly ordered acts . But is this, in fact , the only way in which
the case against IYF can be made? In the following analysis of the second
type of argument, I propose to show that it is not. 18
Type 2: Arguments from Multiple Implications of
Departure from the Natural

As I have already stated , the official Church position does not make the
physical separation the sole ground of moral objection to artificial
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contraception. Nor is the 's eparation considered merely as a separation of
two physical events, sexual intercourse and procreation. Rather, the
ground for moral objection is the separation of " ... the two meanings of
the conjugal act: the unitive meaning and the procreative meaning."20
Thus, the merely physicalist argument cannot claim the support from
the authority of the Magisterial teaching. However, in the light of this ,
another important conclusion follows . It is sometimes presumed that the
precise reason for the rejection of artificial contraception by the
Magisterium was the mere physical separation of sexual union and
procreation. On this same presumption , two different arguments might be
developed. The first would be that, since there is also a separation of sexual
union and procreation in the case of IVF, the latter must be rejected on
exactly the same grounds. The second would challenge the adequacy of the
rejection of artificial contraception on the grounds that the supporting
reasons are "physicalist." Since this reasoning is alleged to fail , it is then
further argued that the separation of sexual union and procreation in IVF
cannot provide grounds for moral rejection (in principle). Both these
arguments are inadequate as I will seek to show by an analysis of a number
of recent contributions to the debate .
Francesco Giunchedi establishes the necessary basis for any further
argument with an explicit rejection of dualism. As he correctly points out ,
the human person is an embodied subject; the body constitutes a part of
the integral human subject. Whatever touches the human body inevitably
touches the person. Since the human person is composed of spirit and
body, the inherent finality or purpose of the body cannot itself be the
ground of a moral norm except to the degree that reason discovers in it a
significance. This significance carries a moral imperative insofar as it
guarantees the fullness of human meaning in an action .21
Integral humanity is construed here in terms of integral significance or
signification. Where the integral significance is attacked, integral
humanity is thereby attacked. The author then applie this to IVF. The
separation of the unitive aspect and the procreative aspect of human
sexuality violates integral signification and so violates integral humanity.
But, according to Giunchedi , where the separation is brought about
precisely to actualize procreation, the moral significance is different.
Therefore , IVF cannot be judged morally in the same way as artificial
contraception. 22
This argument seems to me to be fundamentally sound in its basic
direction and intention. The argument that artificial contraception to
avoid procreation and IVF to promote procreation have different moral
meanings and must be judged differently also seems convincing. However,
there is need for more explicit explanation of some of the links in the
argument. How does reason go about establishing the precise nature ofthe
"signification" of an act? Without a further explanation of this point, it is
not clear why a separation of the exercise of sexuality and the event of
conception necessarily separate the signification of the unitive and
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procreative. If the normal physical, biological link between the two
immediately established the necessary link between the two significations,
the argument would stand. But that step would seem to take us back, after
all, to identifying the physical structures with the structures of
signification and so with the moral norm. The precise meaning of this
intermediary notion of signification needs more explanation if the
argument is to be completely convincing. Furthermore, why is it
necessarily and absolutely required that every act have full human
signification?
John M. Finnis argues that the departure from the natural process of
procreation is morally significant, not simply because it deviates from the
physically normal, but because of its implications for the parent-child
relationship. To choose to have a child by IYF is to choose to have a child
as the product of a making. This choice structures the relationship of
parents to child as one of a maker to product. A relationship of maker to
product is inherently one of radical inequality and essential subordination. This does not mean, he is careful to point out, that the child has an
objectively real different status. Rather, the structure of choices , " ...
tends to assign (that) child, in its inception, the same status as other
objects of acquisition ."24
A similar argument has been presented by Donald G. McCarthy and
Edward J. Bayer. These authors argue that the child of technological
intervention does not issue from normal human fertility and the
procreative embrace of the parents. Thus, its origin is different in a radical
way from that ofthe normal origin of a child. The nature of the harm to
the child is expressed through the language of rights. The claim is made
that every child has a natural right to fundamental security and selfidentity. This no one would dispute . The authors, however, extend the
argument by proposing that the child has such a right to that kind of
security which comes from generation through natural marital
intercourse. Thus, it follows that every child who is copceived as the
"product" of technology incurs a specific harm or "handicap." The choice
of parents to conceive a child by such means involves the infliction of
harm on the child , and violates the right it has to this specific form of
security. They support their case by calling to mind our growing
awareness of the problems which arise from disrupting the fundamental
relationships of nature. It is granted that , so far, there is no empirical
evidence for such a handicap. But they insist that such a handicap is
objectively present whether or not it has any measurable effect on the
child. 25
Both these arguments postulate an objective harm to the child. But
such an argument from a non-verifiable harm does not seem to be very
strong. On the other hand , an argument based on the voluntary exposure
of the infant to be conceived to the risk of harm would have much more
force. 26 But in this case, the harm envisaged is a real, possible
indentifiable damage to the child, which cannot be precluded.
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Nevertheless, this type of argument is important in that it indicates a
move away from a physicalist interpretation of the "natural design."
What seems to be occurring in the debate is a move towards a more
nuanced interpretation of the natural law which focuses on the
interpersonal implications of deviation from the natural.
Another form of argument has been developed by William E. May.27
May's argument does not rest on the physical inseparability of the
procreative and unitive . He challenges the positions of those who allege
that the papal teaching itself erected physical separability of these
elements into a moral norm . Thus, we may not take physical integrity of
the marriage act as the determinative , morally relevant feature of the
natural design . What , then , are the further significant features to which
we must attend? May's argument confronts directly the proposal of John
Mahoney, namely that marital / parental love may be embodied in a
complex of choices and actions other than those choices and actions
involved in the sexual union of spouses open to procreation . His case does
not rest directly on a postulated harm to the child who may be conceived ,
but on the inherent character of the spouses' actions. According to May ,
the actions and choices of couples engaging in IYF are non-marital. Wh y
is this so? In cases involving donors or vendors of sperm or ova, this
would be clear. Similarly, IYF in the case of the non-married would be
dearly non-marital. But the case is also made that, even for persons who
are married, such choices and actions would be non-marital.
What is the lack which constitutes these acts non-marital? It is not
merely the lack of a physical conjunction of sexual union and
procreation. It would seem to be rather the lack of actual embodiment of
marital love in the procedure which leads to procreation. Couples are
capable of sexual intercourse by the mere fact that they possess sexual
organs . But they are capable of expressing marital / parental love only if
they are actually committed to each other in marital love. It is only when
that kind of committed love is actually embodied irf an act that it is a
marital act. Thus , sexual intercourse between a couple who happen to be
married , but who do not actually express their marital love in that act
would , presumably, be a non-marital act in this sense. Why is it, then , that
such marital / parental love cannot be embodied in acts other than the
natural sexual union? There would seem to be a presupposition here
which is not fully explained . May's argument seems to be that such acts
might be acco mpanied by what the couple intend to be marital / parental
love . But such acts cannot embody and express what is truly
marital / parental love . Why is this? Perhaps there is presupposed here a
notion of bodiliness as sacrament or symbol of the person, together with a
notion of bodily union as sacrament or symbol of the marital love of
persons. Other "embodiments" apart from sexual union are then, as it
were , not "apt matter" for the "sacrament." Although this argument
seems to need further development, the direction in which it moves is
reasonably clear. It is an argument not from the nature of the act , or
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from the nature of physical sexuality, but rather from the nature of
personal marital love . 28 It would seem to be a search for a way of
overcoming the problem of dualism, not through a metaphysical
explanation of the union of soul and body or rationality and physicality,
but rather through an analysis of embodied love.

Type 3: Arguments from the Structure of Relationships and
Procreative Intention
A common feature of this type is the argument that the kind of
depersonalizing and instrumentalizing attitudes discussed previously
could be present in the undertaking of IVF and ET and, if they were, this
would mean a violation of love values and dignity values. In such a case the
undertaking would be morally wrong. But this form of argument differs
from type 2 in that it does not accept that the choice of alternative means of
procreation (such as the technology of IVF) necessarily entails an attack
on the love values or the dignity values. The essence of the argument is that
authentic marital-parental love may be embodied in other choices and
actions and in such a way that no violation of the dignity of the persons is
inevitably involved.
An example of this kind of argument has been proposed by Josef G.
Ziegler.29 Ziegler's argument is founded on an interpretation of the integral
structure of marriage. This structure, he explains , is an instance of the
threefold , inter-connected relationship proper to any act , namely
relationship to God, to neighbor and to self. This is founded on " .. . the
being and meaning structure of created reality." The question then is : Is
this relationship preserved in extra-corporeal generation? A Christian
couple actualizes this relationship when they strive together to realize the
sacramental imaging of the relationship of Christ to the Church in
indissoluble marriage . Closely bound up with this is the actualizing of the
individual element of marriage in partner love. This finds i~ starting point
in recognition of the equal dignity of wife and husband. Thus they
increasingly advance their own perfection as well as their mutual
sanctification, and hence contribute to the glory of God . 30 The cultic
(God-oriented) and individual elements find their expression in the social
component , the generation and education of children . An action within
marriage is thus to be qualified as good if it corresponds to the principle of
integration of these fundamental elements. 31
Thus far, the analysis of the structure of created reality seems to prescind
from the bodiliness of human created reality. However, this aspect does
playa part in the argument. Ziegler considers IVF a form of therapy. The
pathological defect in the otherwise naturally given connection between
partnership and procreation is healed by an artificial connection. It is
artificial but is, nevertheless, made possible by nature. Thus, it can be
argued that the law of procreativity which God has established in human
nature is preserved in this case. The element of interpersonal love can also
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be retained , as can the "cultic" structure, because the medical intervention
is understood as a fulfillment of the creative love of God .32 Thus, in this
form of argument, the natural , bodily structure of human sexuality has
significance for the moral evaluation of .IYF. The latter is morally
acceptable insofar as it is "therapeutic" and made possible by "nature."
Can this interpretation stand? It could be objected that IYF is not
therapeutic in the proper sense since it does not heal the pathological
condition. That remains after the use of IYF as before. Again , it could be
argued that IYF does not assist the natural process but replaces it. 33 It
would seem to be "therapeutic" only in the sense that it can produce the
same results as the "normal" process. If this is what is meant, it would seem
to represent a falling back into a form of "instrumental dualism." Since
what is significant in the bodily structures is simply the capacity to produce
the results (i .e., to reproduce) , when this capacity is absent, a procedure
which produces that same result can be called "therapeutic" and is thus
justifiable. Other implications of the procedure do not have moral
relevance.
The authors have something else in mind , however. The healing is
directed not simply to the physical pathology, but rather to the totality of
the continuing life of married love which is meant to , and in the case of this
couple's intentions and desires actually does , reach out towards a child to
be conceived and loved. The "pathology" in question is not merely physical
damage, but a fracturing of this totality. The argument is , then, that the
integral whole of the married project is damaged by lack of the capacity to
conceive. Thus, the supplying of this capacity is "therapeutic" in respect to
this total human reality. 34 Perhaps we could see here another attempt to
overcome the problem of "dualism." Here the principle of unity is, again ,
not a metaphysical notion, but the historical continuity of the total project
of committed married life, conjoining body and spirit in the intention to
open marital parental love to the actual possibility of a child to be loved .
However, there are serious lacunae in some of the arguments for the
moral justification (under certain conditions) of IYF. These become clear
in the light of the instance on the moral relevance of human bodiliness
which the arguments of the second type correctly stress. Some authors
explicitly reject dualism and affirm the corporeal nature of the human
person. 35Others argue that, under certain conditions, external fecundation
may be the prolongation of the sexual life of the couple. 36 But they, in fact ,
give little attention to the bodily nature of this sexual life, nor to the moral
relevance of this corporeal dimension. Others recognize that IYF must be
the last resort , thus apparently recognizing some moral significance in the
"normal" process Y But it is not adequately explained what the
significance of the normal really is. While these arguments clearly do not
assume that the bodily and , in particular, the link between sexual-union
and procreation is neutral and has no significance for moral value, they do
not provide any account of this presumed significance. They seem to
assume that this dimension has value, though not an absolute value. But
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until the grounding of this value is explained , this claim is an assertion ,
rather than a proven conclusion.
What conclusions would follow from these analyses? On the level of
fundamental principle, I would argue that the key point is the necessity of
overcoming dualism (of whatever kind). A solution to the difficulties
discussed here will be possible only in the light of a genuinely integrated
understanding of humanity. On the level of moral conclusions, the matter
is more complex. Some points , however, are clear. In terms of the present
teaching of the Magisterium on the inseparability of the unitiveprocreative dimensions of human sexual expression, IYF (and ET) would
not be morally justifiable. What, then , of the growing acceptance of
artificial procreative techniques among many moral theologians? The
issue I have tried to deal with here is the intrinsic adequacy of the
arguments proposed. I would conclude that these arguments are, for the
reasons explained, not adequate in themselves to sustain a convincing
case.
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